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Abstract
We show that defensive distillation is not secure: it is no
more resistant to targeted misclassification attacks than
unprotected neural networks.
1 Introduction
It is an open question how to train neural networks so
they will be robust to adversarial examples [6]. Defen-
sive distillation [5] was recently proposed as an approach
to make feed-forward neural networks robust against ad-
versarial examples.
In this short paper, we demonstrate that defensive dis-
tillation is not effective. We show that, with a slight mod-
ification to a standard attack, one can find adversarial ex-
amples on defensively distilled networks. We demon-
strate the attack on the MNIST [2] digit recognition task.
Distillation prevents existing techniques from finding
adversarial examples by increasing the magnitude of the
inputs to the softmax layer. This makes an unmodified
attack fail. We show that if we artificially reduce the
magnitude of the input to the softmax function, and make
two other minor changes, the attack succeeds. Our attack
achieves successful targeted misclassification on 96.4%
of images by changing on average 4.7% of pixels.
2 Background
2.1 Neural Networks and Notation
We assume familiarity with neural networks [3], adver-
sarial examples [6], and defensive distillation [5]. We
briefly review the key details and notation.
Let F(θ ,x) = y be a neural network with model
parameters θ evaluated on input instance x, with the
last layer a softmax activation. Call the second-to-last
layer (the layer before the the softmax layer) Z, so that
F(θ ,x) = softmax(Z(θ ,x)). When F is used for classifi-
cation tasks, each output yi corresponds to the predicted
probability that the object x is labelled as class i. We let
C(θ ,x) = argmaxi F(θ ,xi) correspond to the classifica-
tion of x. Often we ommit θ for clarity. In this paper
we are concerned with neural networks used to classify
greyscale images.
Adversarial examples [6] are instances x′ which are
very close to a valid instance x with respect to some dis-
tance metric, but where C(θ ,x) 6=C(θ ,x′). Given an in-
put image x and a target class t (different than the correct
classification of x), a targeted misclassification attack is
possible if an adversary can find an adversarial example
x′ such thatC(θ ,x′) = t and x′ is very similar to x. As the
targetted attack is more powerful we focus on this.
Papernot’s attack [4] is an algorithm for finding ad-
versarial examples that are close to the original image
with respect to the L0 distance metric (i.e., few pixels are
changed). We describe the attack as proposed by Paper-
not et al. The reader is referred to their paper for motiva-
tion and explanation of why it succeeds [4].
The attack consists of many iterations of a greedy se-
lection procedure. In each iteration, Papernot’s attack
chooses pixels (p∗,q∗) to change that will make the de-
sired target classification t most likely. It sets these pixels
to either fully-on or fully-off to make t the most likely.
This is repeated until either (a) the image is classified as
the target, or (b) more than 112 pixels are changed (the
threshold determined to be detectable).
In order to pick the best pair of pixels to modify, the
attack uses the gradient of the network to approximate
their importance. Let
αpq = ∑
i∈{p,q}
∂Z(x)t
∂xi
βpq =
(
∑
i∈{p,q}
9
∑
j=0
∂Z(x) j
∂xi
)
−αpq
so that αpq represents how much changing (p,q) will
change the target classification, and βpq represents how
much changing (p,q) will change all other outputs. Then
the algorithm picks
(p∗,q∗) = argmax
(p,q)
(−αpq ·βpq) · (αpq > 0) · (βpq < 0)
so that α > 0 (the target class is more likely), β < 0
(the other classes become less likely), and −α · β is
largest. Notice that Papernot’s attack uses the output of
the second-to-last layer Z, the logits, in the calculation of
the gradient: the output of the softmax F is not used.1
1The authors indicated via personal communication that they use
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Defensive distillation was proposed to prevent adversar-
ial examples [5]. It is trained in three steps:
1. Train a network (the teacher) using standard tech-
niques. In this network, the output is given by
F(θ ,x) = softmax(Z(θ ,x)/T ) for some tempera-
ture T . As T → ∞ the distribution approaches uni-
form; as T → 0+ the distribution approaches the
hard maximum; standard softmax uses T = 1.
2. Evaluate the teacher network on each instance of
the training set to produce soft labels. These soft
labels contain additional information; for example
the network may say a digit x has a 80% chance of
being a 7 and a 20% chance of being a 1.
3. Train a second network (the distilled network) on
the soft labels again using temperature T . By train-
ing on the soft labels, the model should overfit the
data less and try to be more regular.
Finally, to classify an input, run the distilled network us-
ing temperature T = 1. By training at temperature T ,
the logits (the inputs to the softmax) become on average
T times larger in absolute value to minimize the cross-
entropy loss. This causes the network to become signifi-
cantly more confident in its predictions when evaluating
on temperature 1.
We choose T = 100, which was found to be the most
difficult to attack of the temperatures that were proposed
for use with defensive distillation [5]. Defensive distilla-
tion with T = 100 lowers the success probability of Pa-
pernot’s attack to 0.45% and increases the average num-
ber of pixels required to change the classification from
2% to 14%.
2.2 Our Implementation
We use TensorFlow [1] to re-implement defensive distil-
lation and our variant on Papernot’s attack.
We use the same 9-layer network architecture as pro-
posed by Papernot et al. [5]. We use a slightly smaller
learning rate, which we found to converge more quickly.
We train on the MNIST [2] data set. Our baseline model
achieves 99.4% accuracy; the distilled network 99.1%.
This is comparable to the state-of-the-art.
Our model creation and attack code is open source and
available at http://nicholas.carlini.com/
code/nn_defensive_distillation; all of the
data in this paper is reproducible from the provided code.
F , the output of the softmax, when attacking defensively distilled net-
works. This is different than the attack as initially presented. This does
not change any of our results.
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Figure 1: Cumulative density function showing probability that
we we can find a targetted adversarial example on a defensively
distilled network a given number of pixels changed.
3 Breaking Distillation
We demonstrate that defensive distillation is not effective
by modifying Papernot’s L0 attack described above.
Examining why distillation stops Papernot’s attack.
Recall that distillation as used above does not take the
derivative with respect to the last softmax layer, but in-
stead with the second-to-last layer. When dealing with
the input to the softmax layer (the logits), it is important
to realize the differences in relative impact of terms. If
the smallest input to the softmax layer is −100, then, af-
ter the softmax layer, the corresponding output becomes
practically zero. If this input changes from−100 to−90,
the output will still be practically zero. However, if the
largest input to the softmax layer is 10, and it changes to
0, this will have a massive impact on the softmax output.
Relating this to the α and β used above, because Pa-
pernot’s attack computes the gradient of the input to the
softmax layer, α and β represent the size of the change
at the input to the softmax layer. It is perhaps surprising
that Papernot’s attack works on un-distilled networks: it
treats all changes as being of equal importance, regard-
less of how much they change the softmax output. For
example it will not change a pixel increases α from 10 to
20 if it would also increase β from −100 to −80, even
if the latter is merely because some value would change
from −40 to −20. Thus, Papernot’s algorithm may fail
to find an adversarial example even if one exists.
2
When we train a distilled network at temperature T
and then test it at temperature 1, we effectively cause
the inputs to the softmax to become larger by a factor of
T . By minimizing the cross entropy during training, the
output of the softmax is forced to be close to 1.0 for the
correct class and 0.0 for all others. Since Z(θ ,x) is di-
vided by T , the network will simply learn to make the
Z(θ , ·) values T times larger than they otherwise would
be. (Positive values are forced to become about T times
larger; negative values are multiplied by a factor of about
T and thus become even more negative.) Experimentally,
we verified this fact: the mean value of the L1 norm of
Z(θ ,x) (the logits) on the undistilled network is 5.8 with
standard deviation 6.4; on the distilled network (with
T = 100), the mean is 482 with standard deviation 457.
In effect, this magnifies the sub-optimality noted above
and causes Papernot’s attack to fail spectacularly when
applied to the distilled network.
Modifying the attack. Fixing this issue requires only
minor modifications to Papernot’s attack. First, instead
of taking the gradient of the inputs to the softmax, we
instead take the gradient of the actual output of the net-
work. However, now the gradients vanish due to the large
absolute value of the inputs to the softmax. To resolve
this, we artificially divide the inputs to the softmax by T
before using them. Let
Fˆ(θ ,x) = softmax(Z(θ ,x)/T )
Now the inputs to the softmax are of acceptable size and
the gradients no longer vanish. Second, we are able to
achieve slightly better accuracy by taking the maximum
over α − β instead of the product used earlier. In fact,
with these modifications, we do not lower accuracy even
if we search over one pixel at a time instead of pairs
of pixels, which is significantly (768×) more efficient.
Thus, when selecting the best pixel to modify, we select
p∗ = argmax
p
2
∂ Fˆ(x)t
∂xp
−
9
∑
j=0
∂ Fˆ(x) j
∂xp
where we have simplified terms.
For the strongest setting of T = 100, we achieve a suc-
cessful targetted misclassification rate of 96.4%, chang-
ing on average 36.4 pixels out of 768 (4.7% of the pix-
els). Figure 1 shows a CDF of the number of pixels re-
quired to change the classification for successful attacks.
We verified that our attack works for any other setting of
T from 1 to 100, the same range studied initially.
As a baseline for comparison, we ran our modified at-
tack against a standard network trained without distilla-
tion. Note that this is not an entirely fair comparison: we
have made changes to increase success against distilled
networks. Despite this, our attack succeeds 86% of the
time with on average 45 pixels changed. This indicates
that the network trained with defensive distillation is no
more secure against adversarial examples than a standard
network trained without distillation.
4 Conclusion
When creating a defense of any form, it is important to
analyze how it might be attacked. It is not sufficient to
demonstrate that it defends against existing attacks; it
must also be effective against future attacks.
While it is impossible to test against all possible future
attacks, we encourage designers to look for an argument
that existing attacks can not be adapted. After observ-
ing that an attack fails on a proposed defense, it would
be useful to understand why the attack fails. As we have
shown in this case study, it is possible that the attack only
fails due to superficial reasons, and small modifications
can result in failure of the defense. While Papernot’s at-
tack is powerful enough to break unhardened networks, it
makes no claims of optimality, and demonstrating that a
defense successfully stops a sub-optimal attack does not
imply it will stop all other attacks.
Defending against adversarial examples remains a
challenging open problem for the field. When propos-
ing a defense, we recommend researchers evaluate why
the defense works and whether it will be effective against
attacks targeted at that specific defense.
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